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Abstract 
 
The incentive regulation of costs related to physical and cyber security in electricity 
networks is an important but relatively unexplored and ambiguous issue. These costs 
can be part of cost efficiency benchmarking or, alternatively, dealt with separately. 
This paper discusses the issues and proposes options for incorporating network 
security costs within incentive regulation in a benchmarking framework. The 
relevant concerns and limitations associated with the accounting and classification of 
network security costs, choice of cost drivers, data adequacy and quality and the 
relevant benchmarking methodologies are discussed. The analysis suggests that the 
present regulatory treatment of network security costs using benchmarking is limited 
to being an informative regulatory tool rather than being deterministic. We discuss 
how alternative approaches outside the benchmarking framework, such as the use of 
stochastic cost-benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis of network security 
investments can complement the results obtained from benchmarking. 
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1. Introduction 
The introduction of incentive-based regulation since market liberalization has coincided with 
a gradual adoption of cost and efficiency benchmarking as a regulatory instrument by many 
European energy regulators. For example, Norway introduced incentive regulation and 
efficiency benchmarking in 1997 while Germany followed suit in 2009. Benchmarking can 
be broadly defined as a comparison of some measure of actual efficiency and productivity 
performance against a reference or benchmark performance (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2000). The 
primary role of benchmarking under incentive regulation is to decouple the allowed revenues 
of a network utility from its own underlying costs by determining the regulated revenue cap 
based on the cost of efficient networks.  
Benchmarking allows comparative regulation and uses outside information beyond what is 
revealed by the regulated network itself. Hence, benchmarking serves as a regulatory tool to 
eliminate or reduce the firm’s asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
advantage with its operational and capital costs (inputs) and demand
1
. The use of available 
outside information in network regulation that is retrieved independently of the network 
companies implies that benchmarking, in effect, aims to mimic the incentive mechanisms of a 
competitive market in a monopoly environment. This resembles a yardstick competition in its 
extreme form where the outcomes of perfect competition are replicated in a regulated natural 
monopoly context (Shleifer, 1985). 
However, the European electricity supply industry (ESI) is undergoing fundamental technical 
changes in the drive towards sustainability and ensuring the security of supply signalling 
changes in energy policy priorities from the overriding economic efficiency goals. 
Competitiveness, energy security and decarbonisation have become the main energy policy 
priorities post liberalisation (Pollitt and Haney, 2013). These changes have also sparked 
debate on how incentive regulation and the application of benchmarking within incentive 
regulation should evolve (Cambini et al., 2014). For example, it is estimated that the required 
costs of the transmission grid expansions in Europe will be in the region of 104 billion euros 
(ENTSOE, 2012). Similarly, the investment needs in Europe's distribution grid is estimated to 
be around 520 billion euros by 2035 in the transition towards a low-carbon economy 
(EURELECTRIC, 2012). These investments are driven by the need to accommodate rapid 
                                                             
1 This is a typical information asymmetry problem arising in a principal-agent relationship where the 
regulated agent holds superior information on its own cost and demand structures than the principal 
(or the regulator in our case). See Laffont and Tirole (1993) for more details. 
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technological advances in distributed energy resources such as solar, energy storage, electric 
vehicles, micro-grids, intelligent home energy management, demand aggregation, and 
demand response, all leading to a complex future with a differing role for electricity networks 
(Sioshansi, 2016). Large-scale investment requirements can alter the cost structure and the 
use of inputs (operational and capital expenditures) by network companies. Network 
investments are also 'lumpy', implying increased uncertainty in benchmarking analysis. This 
is because investments are mostly irreversible and the future is uncertain (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994; Bruneekreft, 2013).  
Addressing the concerns of inadequate supply security would also imply that incentive 
regulation is evolving from an input-oriented to an output-oriented approach. An output-
based incentive regulation approach evaluates the monopoly’s performance in terms of the 
quantity and quality of delivered outputs, such as energy and connection services as well as 
service quality and provides incentives to improve quality (Vogelsang, 2006). However, the 
probable inclusion of additional output measures of performance such as network security is 
unexplored by regulators and scarcely discussed among academics and policymakers.  
The aim of the paper is to illustrate how output measures of supply security performance such 
as ‘network security’ can be utilised using benchmarking analysis within an incentive 
regulation framework. We conceptualize ‘network security’ as encompassing the 
conventional elements of supply security, such as short-run operational reliability, 
commercial reliability, and long-run resource adequacy (see e.g. Joskow, 2007), along with 
security threats arising from natural, accidental and malicious (or exceptional) events facing 
the electricity network (see Nepal and Jamasb, 2013)
2
. The paper defines and designs a 
suitable output metrics of network security to be incorporated in an output-oriented incentive 
regulation framework. The paper also stimulates policy discussion on conceptual and 
technical aspects of incorporating network security in an incentive regulation framework 
using a benchmarking analysis. 
The remainder of the paper is organised in four sections. Section 2 discusses the literature on 
the theoretical and empirical linkages between incentive regulation and network security by 
focussing on the regulation of quality of service in the European context. Quality of service is 
an integral but not the only component of network security (Nepal and Jamasb, 2013). 
                                                             
2 According to CEER (2012), exceptional events include exceptional weather conditions and other 
exceptional circumstances that can significantly affect the continuity of supply. We share the same 
understanding of exceptional events in the remainder of the paper.  
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Section 3 focuses on general approaches to benchmarking analysis of network security with 
different benchmarking options, such as network security costs, network security cost drivers, 
data (or sample) size and quality, and the mathematical techniques. Section 4 proposes an 
output metrics for network security, critically reflects on the findings from the previous 
sections, and offers policy recommendations. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Relevant Literature Review  
Electricity networks exhibit natural monopoly characteristics, such as economies of scale, 
scope and density due to high sunk costs and low marginal operating costs (Kahn, 1971). In 
the absence of regulatory interventions, network companies face low incentives for internal 
efficiency and greater incentives for rent-seeking, leading to distortions in allocative 
efficiency. Hence, incentive-based regulation (such as price cap or revenue cap regimes) of 
network entry, access and charges has been implemented in many European countries since 
the liberalisation of the electricity sector. Utility benchmarking under incentive regulation 
aims to promote economic efficiency (cost, allocative, and dynamic efficiencies) by reducing 
the regulated firm’s information advantage with its inputs and demand. It can thus be viewed 
as a second best solution to competitive markets (Newbery, 2002; Joskow, 2013).  
Benchmarking can be a useful tool in assessing the efficiency and performance of the 
regulated company in meeting the productivity objectives defined by the regulator ex-ante 
(Ajodhia et al., 2004). The results from statistical benchmarking methods help to determine 
the relative efficiency of an individual company’s operating costs and service quality relative 
to their peers. This information can then be used as input for setting the initial price 'Po
'
 and 
the 'X' factors, reflecting the cost reduction path during a given regulatory period (Jamasb et 
al., 2004; Joskow, 2008). A robust benchmarking can aid the regulator in determining the 
relative efficiency of different network companies and in setting their reasonable targets in 
terms of cost efficiency (Coelli et al., 2008). Hence, benchmarking of network companies can 
play a key role in sharing the benefits of efficiency improvements with consumers and 
ensuring that regulated network companies earn a fair return on their investments (Haney and 
Pollitt, 2013). 
From a theory point of view, the optimum level of network security (and service quality) is 
attained when a profit maximising regulated company increases network security to the point 
where the marginal benefit of additional network security equals the companies’ marginal 
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cost of increasing security (see Sappington, 2005). Figure 1 presents a graphical 
representation of the optimum level of network security considering that the reliability level 
reflects the consumers' preferences. However, regulation of network security or other aspects 
of the security of electricity supply such as service quality suffers from three major problems 
(Spence, 1975; Fraser, 1994): a) the problem of measuring service quality; b) the lack of 
information on the actual consumer demand for service quality; and c) the lack of information 
on the efficient costs required to produce optimal service quality.  
 
 
Figure 1: Socio-economic optimization of network security 
 
In many European countries, service quality is treated under separate incentive schemes and 
rewards and penalty scheme (RPS) (CEER, 2012; Fumagalli, 2012). For example, in 2000, 
Italy introduced a RPS followed by Norway and Great Britain in 2001 and 2002 respectively, 
while France introduced an RPS in 2009. Under the RPS, the regulated tariff (or the allowed 
revenue) of the network company is increased (rewarded) or decreased (penalised) in 
proportion to the difference between the actual performance and target performance set by 
the regulator ex-ante and an incentive rate in the form of a monetary value per unit change in 
service quality. The RPS incentive structure is in line with the theory of optimal incentive 
scheme when quality is verifiable (Laffont and Tirole, 1989). The RPS scheme places 
Total
O&M Costs
Investment Costs
Interruption Costs(IC)
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importance on precisely identifying the underlying production technology of the network 
company to promote efficient delivery of service and quality (Coelli et al., 2013). 
 
An alternative approach is to include network security aspects such as service quality into the 
efficiency benchmarking. This approach would imply that the efficiency requirement also 
includes incentives for service quality (and network security) improvements. Moreover, the 
cost efficiency or cost saving objectives of incentive regulation can adversely affect service 
quality (and network security) if the regulated prices are not allowed to increase, as the 
network company incurs greater costs to improve the service quality (Sappington, 2005). For 
example, empirical studies, such as Ter-Martirosyan (2003) and Ter-Martirosyan and Kwoka 
(2010) have shown that in the absence of appropriate quality controls, incentive regulation 
leads to deteriorating levels of service quality in the US electricity networks. 
Only a few empirical studies based on panel and cross-sectional data have explicitly included 
service quality in benchmarking analysis in the European context while examining the effects 
of incentive regulation on service quality. Giannakis et al. (2005) used the data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) frontier method to measure technical efficiency (TE) based on non-
parametric input distance functions and total factor productivity (TFP) growth among the 
UK’s 14 distribution companies for the period 1991/92 to 1998/99. The results showed that 
cost-efficient firms did not necessarily exhibit high service quality, although it was desirable 
to integrate quality of service in benchmarking. Similarly, Yu et al. (2009) presented an 
empirical approach to measure and incorporate service quality into benchmarking analysis in 
the UK distribution networks from 1990/91 to 2003/04 using the DEA technique that 
extended the earlier research by Giannakis et al. (2005). The results showed that from a 
performance point of view, cost and quality were not separable and that there were potential 
trade-offs between costs and quality of service.  
 
Coelli et al. (2008) estimated a benchmarking model incorporating a service quality 
parameter for the 92 French electricity distribution units of EDF for the period, 2003-2005. 
Using the SFA and DEA techniques with input distance functions, the results showed that 
inclusion of service quality had no significant effect on the mean TE scores, implying that 
including a quality indicator in efficiency benchmarking had no substantial effect. Growitsch 
et al. (2009) undertook an efficiency analysis of distribution networks from seven European 
countries applying the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method to multi-output translog 
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input distance function models. The results showed significant potential trade-offs between 
quality and efficiency scores, especially for smaller network companies.  
 
Some recent studies have examined the impact of quality of service regulation on the 
performance of network companies in terms of cost efficiency and quality provision using 
benchmarking analysis. Norway is a notable exception in integrating the cost of quality (in 
the form of the value of energy not delivered) in the efficiency benchmarking exercise. 
Growitsch et al. (2010) explored the impact of incorporating customers' willingness-to-pay 
for service quality in benchmarking models on cost efficiency of distribution networks in 
Norway using the DEA technique. The results showed that the introduction of service quality 
regulation had no conflict with and impact on the performance and cost efficiency of the 
network utilities.  
In the UK electricity distribution, Jamasb et al. (2012), by specifying a new empirical model, 
showed that regulatory incentives to reduce service interruptions had not been sufficiently 
strong to achieve economically efficient levels of service quality. However, the economic 
incentives to encourage utilities to reduce network energy losses have led to performance 
improvements in this area. 
Cambini et al. (2014) investigated the response of the largest Italian electricity distribution 
company to the input- and output-based incentives using a balanced panel for 115 companies 
spanning 2004 to 2009. A two-stage, semi-parametric DEA and bootstrapping techniques 
were applied. The main finding was that the presence of quality regulation did not 
significantly alter the behavior of the firms, implying that cost efficiency incentives did not 
conflict (or trade-off) with quality-related incentives. 
The empirical evidence discussed so far suggests that the incorporation of network security in 
efficiency benchmarking is a relatively new concept and remains unexplored both in the 
academic literature and in regulatory practices. A first step towards including network 
security in benchmarking analysis would be to establish a conceptual benchmarking 
framework for network security. This presents a major knowledge gap which our study aims 
to bridge to some extent. 
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3. Benchmarking Frameworks 
The incorporation of network security in benchmarking analysis typically involves 
identifying the network security-related 'inputs' (such as capital and operating expenditures of 
network security) and a range of network security-related 'outputs' (such as quality of service, 
e.g., duration and frequency of interruptions). A network company will then be regarded as 
being more efficient, in our case in delivering network security, if it is able to deliver more 
network security-related outputs while using less input factors.  
Table 1 presents several considerations that arise in connection with integrating network 
security in a benchmarking framework. A benchmarking framework for network security has 
to consider four major dimensions: a) network security-related costs; b) network security-
related cost drivers; c) the data sample; and d) the benchmarking technique. The 
benchmarking framework should identify and describe the conceptual aspects involved in 
benchmarking, along with the categorisation of different benchmarking techniques, as 
discussed below. 
 
Network security-related costs Network security-related costs drivers 
 Top-down versus bottom-up approach 
 If Top-down: Totex on network security 
versus (Opex + Return + Depreciation) 
 Separate OPEX and CAPEX for network 
security 
 By type of network security activities 
 
 High level versus detailed  
 Inclusion of metrics (or outputs) 
 Exogenous variables 
Data sample Techniques 
 Cross-section versus panel 
 Historic data versus future plans 
 International sample versus domestic sample 
 Partial Performance Indicators (PPI) 
 TFP and other index-based productivity 
approaches 
 Norm and reference models 
 Econometric methods (OLS 
/COLS/MOLS) 
 Frontier methods 
 DEA 
 SFA 
Table 1: Several considerations involved in benchmarking network security 
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3.1 Network security-related costs 
Network utilities incur both operational expenditures (Opex) and capital expenditures 
(Capex) related to network security. Opex generally includes operating and maintenance 
costs (both variable and fixed) that the network company incurs during a fiscal year. Capex 
expenditures generate long-term future benefits and are incurred when a network company 
invests in new fixed assets to replace the existing old assets or to expand the network. There 
are several ways in which these costs can be structured, aggregated and treated in a 
benchmarking exercise under an input-based incentive regulation. 
The bottom-up approach involves treating different types of costs (i.e. Opex and Capex) in 
different benchmarking analyses. The Opex can be an aggregate measure or split according to 
the type of network security-related activity (such as wages and salaries, repair costs etc.). 
Each type of cost enters a separate benchmarking model with different cost drivers. However, 
such activity-specific treatment of network security Opex in benchmarking gives rise to 
implementation issues, such as data-quality and data comparability. Effective Opex 
benchmarking requires harmonised rules for cost classifications and allocation that are 
consistently applied across the network companies. On the other hand, Capex benchmarking 
can pose difficulties due to significant heterogeneity between network companies in terms of 
the age of assets, geography, lumpiness of investments and other considerations (Joskow, 
2008). The differences in the cost nature imply that a benchmarking approach to Opex may 
not be suitable for Capex.  
The bottom-up approach to network security benchmarking may be suitable if the regulation 
framework is based on the 'building blocks' approach where the constituent components of 
total costs such as opex and capex are subject to scrutiny. However, the building blocks 
approach suffers from the 'double jeopardy' problem characterised by the allocative and 
accounting trade-offs between Capex and Opex (Ajodhia et al., 2006). A partial cost 
benchmarking under the bottom-up approach can lead to an overall estimate of costs, which 
can be unfeasible, and an unreasonable basis for setting targets, as the regulator combines the 
most efficient (or the lowest) costs for each subset from different network companies 
(Shuttleworth, 2005).  
The top-down approach uses a comparison of total network security costs among network 
companies. The approach can involve controlling for the effects of contextual factors, such as 
economies of scale, scope and density and network topography. Benchmarking total 
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expenditures (Totex) creates a more equal treatment of capital and operational expenditures 
in efficiency analysis, and is an alternative approach to overcoming the problems associated 
with the accounting treatment of capital expenditures. Moreover, an effective Totex 
benchmarking requires large datasets to minimise the aggregation problem as the 
transmission and distribution companies tend to invest in network security assets with a long 
service life. This is important, as network security Totex can constitute lumpy, indivisible, 
volatile and cyclical investments, which lead to wide short-term fluctuations in the annual 
value for Totex. 
An alternative approach to Totex benchmarking is the total cost benchmarking. Total cost 
includes the sum of Opex plus the depreciation of capital and an allowed return on capital. 
Hence, total cost benchmarking, to some extent, addresses the challenges associated with 
capex benchmarking when investments are characterised by lumpiness and annual variability. 
For example, the total cost approach to benchmarking has been adopted by the Dutch and the 
Norwegian regulators in their regulation of transmission and distribution networks (Ajodhia 
et al., 2006). Total cost benchmarking creates incentives to improve security performance in 
both the short and long run. However, determining a suitable basis for depreciation of asset 
values (accounting, regulatory or economic) such as book values versus replacement costs, 
and calculating the return on capital can be problematic (Diewert, 2005). Overall, costs 
benchmarking requires standardised definitions and classifications of Opex and Capex, 
considering the differences in accounting classifications of costs across countries (Cohen, 
2005). 
From a social-welfare perspective, a regulator can also consider incorporating the costs of 
inadequate network security in the total cost estimates and undertake benchmarking analysis 
based on a measure of the social costs of network security. The Finish and Norwegian 
regulators have included the estimated socio-economic cost of outages (i.e., the value of 
energy not served due to outages) as part of the total cost for efficiency benchmarking 
(Kuosmanen, 2012). Outage costs are also used as an instrument to evaluate the social cost of 
service, including service quality. However, there is no consistency in estimating outage costs 
among the EU regulators. Assessing the costs of network security failure can be contentious 
and the information requirement is high considering the multi-faceted and infrequent nature 
of the problem as well as the limitations on data availability and quality. 
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3.2. Network security-related cost drivers 
In economic and benchmarking modelling terms cost drivers are explanatory factors that 
drive the costs of network companies. Hence, it is desirable that the incentive regulation and 
benchmarking models can also reflect the network security. The incorporation of network 
security variables directly within a benchmarking model as 'outputs' can provide incentives to 
deliver these outputs at different cost levels. This is especially relevant given the European 
regulatory concerns with investment inadequacy, innovation and sustainability. Incentive 
regulation is also changing from an input-based to an output-based approach in countries 
such as the UK and Italy (Cambini et al., 2013). An output-oriented approach combines the 
efficiency mechanisms in a revenue cap framework with output-based incentives, including 
those concerning network security. 
The primary cost drivers in network benchmarking can include demand and supply side 
variables, such as the number of connections (a proxy to reflect fixed costs), load served (a 
proxy for network capacity), volume of energy delivered (a proxy to reflect the cost of 
energy), network security variables, network energy losses and network length. The selection 
of cost drivers should ideally be independent of data availability considerations. For example, 
Turvey (2006) criticised the practice of choosing the number of cost drivers to suit the data. 
The use of available data on electricity distributed (MWh) as a proxy for maximum demand 
and on network length per customer as the customer density variable to explain maximum 
demand can be questioned since they are only useful at the sub-station level
3
. This is because 
the relevance of these measures depends on networks having similar customer and load 
factors. On the other hand, the inclusion of network length as an output variable can 
introduce perverse incentives by encouraging network expansion solely to improve relative 
performance (CEPA, 2003).  
Coelli (2012) suggested that one possible approach to choosing the relevant cost drivers is to 
explore the implications of an engineering-based reference or norm model of network 
companies. For example, Burns et al. (2005) described a method previously used in Austria 
for selecting cost drivers based primarily on an engineering-based simulation model of a 
hypothetical distribution network. Jamasb and Soderberg (2009) highlighted the Network 
Performance Assessment Model (NPAM) previously used by energy regulators in Sweden, 
Spain, Peru and Chile. However, network security is generally unexplored in benchmarking 
                                                             
3 If demand falls in one area, spare capacity can’t be ‘physically relocated’ to another area.  
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analysis, implying that the existence of a network security that defines the output indicator as 
a cost driver in benchmarking analysis is largely unknown. 
The quality of service indicators that commonly enter the benchmarking models as 
explanatory variables are the continuity of supply indices, such as the System Average 
Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI) and the System Average Interruption Frequency Index 
(SAIFI). However, these indicators are generally inadequate for mimicking the impact of 
interruptions arising from exceptional events because exceptional events lead to long, 
unplanned interruptions (CEER, 2012). Hence, an alternative approach would be to construct 
a new SAIDI indicator that only accounts for unplanned interruptions of longer than 5 
minutes (Jamasb and Nepal, 2015). Long, unplanned interruption of at least 5 minutes (which 
are relatively more frequent than major exceptional events) can mimic the impact of 
interruptions engendered by exceptional events. Also, while there is limited data on 
exceptional events, more data is available on long, unplanned interruptions. Furthermore, it is 
advisable to use an average measure over several years instead of annual values as 
exceptional events that are less frequent than short and planned interruptions. This would 
increase the stability of the network security indicator.  
For the transmission system reliability, other output indicators such as 'unsupplied energy' or 
average interruption time (AIT) can be used. For example, Ofgem developed incentive 
mechanisms for different aspects of distribution network service quality in 2004. For 
example, a new incentive mechanism in the UK introduced in 2005 focused on transmission 
system reliability as measured by the value of energy not supplied (Ofgem, 2004). However, 
consistent cross-sectional and time-series data measuring different aspects of network 
security such as interruption statistics are generally not available, as network companies do 
not systematically report them. Improving data quality is possible when regulators are 
resourceful and invest the required time and effort. 
3.3 Data samples 
Data availability and quality are important for performing benchmarking analysis for the 
regulation of network security. Accessing larger datasets and improving data quality also 
increases the robustness of the benchmarking results (Lowry et al., 2005). Panel data is 
generally preferable than cross-sectional data in benchmarking analysis, as the results 
obtained from cross-sectional data do not reflect the longer-term security performance of the 
network. The benchmarking results from cross-sectional data may be influenced by 
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exceptional, company-specific events such as one-off major security-related capital 
expenditure. Such results can be misleading in capturing the network security efficiency of 
the companies over time. Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996) found that panel data could 
address certain shortcomings of cross-sectional data, as some variables that are particularly 
important for cross-sectional comparison may not be required for a panel-data analysis. 
However, the use of panel data in network security benchmarking poses certain problems. 
The availability of appropriate price deflators is a concern as the economic value for some 
security inputs needs to be deflated to derive the equivalent constant cost measures. Also, 
panel data may be inconsistent over time due to changes in definitions, accounting standards, 
or data providers. These can limit data comparability over time and across the network 
companies. Furthermore, using benchmarks based on historic costs to determine future 
revenue allowances can be less reliable than has been in the past, when the European 
electricity industry was in more of a steady state (Frontier Economics, 2010). This is 
especially relevant for network security, as the additional costs involved are uncertain in 
terms of magnitude and timing. For example, network companies can incur different costs at 
different times to achieve the security objectives. Hence, benchmarking historic security costs 
under increasing uncertainty are not likely to provide reliable and informative results. 
An alternative to historic cost benchmarking is benchmarking based on future or forecasted 
network security costs. Assessment of planned total security costs against explanatory factors 
and future increases in the outputs of the networks make benchmarking more oriented 
towards improving consumer welfare (Frontier Economics, 2010). The threat of disallowance 
of security enhancing costs and regulatory risks of security assets stranding as a result of ex-
post benchmarking is avoided under this approach. Instead, companies are required to meet 
set security targets at an efficient price. However, future cost benchmarking suffers from the 
risk of inflated costs by the companies (Jenkins, 2011). For example, the Information Quality 
Incentive (IQI) mechanism introduced by Ofgem addresses the incentive by the networks to 
inflate future costs even though it is unlikely to completely eliminate such incentives in 
practice among the companies. Hence, in the absence of long panel data on outputs, analysis 
of historic costs in benchmarking can provide an additional means of assessing future 
expenditure requirements. 
International benchmarking offers another option to increase the sample size and dataset by 
including network companies that operate in other countries. This data enrichment can be 
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especially useful in the benchmarking of transmission companies, given their limited number 
in a single country. This implies that the scope of benchmarking with the country-specific 
transmission companies is low, given their small numbers. For example, the UK has only 
three electricity transmission operators and one gas transmission operator. Studies by Agrell 
and Bogetoft (2009) and Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) on electricity and Jamasb et al. (2008) on 
gas transmission networks provide applications of international benchmarking on efficiency 
analysis and regulation of the transmission companies. However, international benchmarking 
involves issues, such as the availability and consistency of data, exchange rates and technical 
matters for addressing country differences in input price, such as labour, cost of capital, 
regulatory issues such as timing of rate reviews, and environmental factors (Jamasb and 
Pollitt, 2003; Haney and Pollitt, 2013). The trade-off between increasing the sample size and 
maintaining the homogeneity (or adjusting for heterogeneity) of the sample is another issue 
associated with international benchmarking.  
3.4. Benchmarking techniques 
There are different potential approaches to the benchmarking of network security. The choice 
of the method is crucial as it can influence the results significantly. Coelli (2012) describes 
five common benchmarking methods in detail after reviewing the energy regulatory practices 
in 15 OECD countries. The benchmarking methods comprise the Partial Performance 
Indicator (PPI) method, Index-number-based Total Factor Productivity (TFP) analysis, the 
Econometric method (EM), Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), and Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA).  
The PPI method involves the use of trend or ratio analysis of the network companies' inputs 
or outputs, and makes comparisons on the efficiency performance with other networks or an 
industry average (Stone, 2002). This method calculates a single explanatory variable, and the 
indicators produced are generally easy to compute. The data requirements are not high and 
the results are simple to interpret and, therefore, require less data, while the results obtained 
only suggest significant cost differences that exist between network companies. However, as 
a partial indicator it is not able to simultaneously account for multiple inputs.  
The TFP is a ratio of a measure of total output to a measure of total input use that reflects the 
overall productivity change (Turvey, 2006). The TFP method is best used to measure the 
productivity performance of a single or a group of network companies over time. There are 
alternative methods for measuring TFP growth, including non-parametric approaches, such as 
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index numbers and DEA, and parametric approaches, such as Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) and econometric cost-function models. The Index-number-based TFP is commonly 
used for measuring productivity growth when there are a limited number of observations 
available (Fisher, 1922; Diewert, 1992). However, the index-number-based TFP method is 
demanding in terms of information requirement as it requires price and quantity information 
on the inputs and outputs for two or more network companies over long time periods. Austria 
and Germany have used the TFP method to assess the performance of the electricity 
distribution companies in measuring the general productivity trend. 
The econometric methods (EMs) involve the use of a cost function, which shows the output-
cost relationship for cost minimising, or profit maximising network companies. A minimum-
cost function provides the periodic costs incurred by an efficient network company to deliver 
the network services by modelling the technology in place, the output quantities, the input 
prices, and the operating conditions of the company (Coelli et al., 2005). Least-squares-type 
estimations such as ordinary least squares (OLS), corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) or 
modified ordinary least squares (MOLS) are used to estimate the parameters of the cost 
function for comparable companies under this approach (Richmond, 1974). The results are 
then used to derive the expenditures required by individual companies if they are minimising 
costs (i.e. the ‘benchmark cost’) and need to be compared with their observed costs for 
benchmarking purposes. The difference in the observed cost from the benchmark cost is 
largely attributable to management or controllable inefficiency. Hence, the EMs do not allow 
for a separate random error term from the inefficiency terms in the modelling while they also 
require specification of a correct functional form. UK and Ireland have used the EMs in 
electricity distribution in additional and supporting analyses. 
SFA is an extended parametric econometric method that is used in cost benchmarking. The 
technique enables the estimation of a cost frontier from which actual costs incurred by the 
network can be compared. However, it differs from traditional econometric approaches in 
two important ways (Schmidt, 1976). SFA focuses on estimating the cost frontier 
representing the minimum costs rather than estimating the cost function representing the 
‘average’ network company. SFA also separates the random statistical noise from the 
estimation of inefficiency by separating the composite residuals into two components 
consisting of a random error term and a term capturing ‘other departures from the frontier’. 
The terms capturing ‘other departures from the frontier’ are assumed to be management-
controllable inefficiencies. SFA has been used in Germany, Finland and Sweden. 
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On the other hand, DEA is a non-parametric technique that can compare the efficiency and 
productivity of companies that produce similar outputs using similar inputs. Unlike 
parametric techniques, DEA does not require ex-ante assumptions about the shape of the 
underlying production function or cost function (Coelli et al., 2005). Information about the 
shape of the real-world production technology is inferred from observations of the input-
output combinations used by the businesses. However, as a deterministic method, DEA 
results are sensitive to outlying observations. DEA has been applied by energy regulators in 
Finland, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria. 
Figure 2 shows the data and information requirements for different benchmarking techniques 
reflecting differences in the comprehensiveness and accuracy of methods along the spectrum 
of simplicity to complexity. PPI has limited data requirements and is less complicated while 
TFP is information-intensive, as it requires both price and quantity information on inputs and 
outputs, which makes the technique more complicated. The other three methods (EMs, SFA 
and DEA) are more effective with larger samples and lie between the two extremes of the 
spectrum.  
 
Low                            Complexity                     High 
PPI EM SFA  DEA       TFP 
Low                Information Intensive               High 
Fig 2: Data requirements and complexity of different benchmarking techniques 
 
Table 2 shows the general properties of the different benchmarking techniques. SFA seems to 
be the most complete approach, being relatively strong on both theoretical and statistical 
grounds and, hence, the most suitable candidate technique for benchmarking of network 
security costs. 
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Properties \ 
Techniques 
PPI TFP EM SFA DEA 
Type 
Non-
parametric 
Non-
parametric 
Parametric Parametric 
Non-
parametric 
Presence of 
random error 
No No 
Yes (one 
composite 
error term) 
Yes No 
Presence of 
inefficiency 
No No 
Yes (one 
composite 
error term) 
Yes Yes 
Presence of 
optimal behaviour 
No Yes 
Yes (cost 
function) 
Yes (cost 
frontier) 
Yes  
(frontier 
firms) 
Number of inputs Single Multiple Multiple Multiple Multiple 
Number of outputs Single Multiple Multiple Multiple Multiple 
Data requirements 
Cross 
sectional or 
time series 
Cross 
sectional or 
time series 
or panel 
Cross 
sectional or 
time series 
or panel 
Cross 
sectional or 
panel 
Cross 
sectional or 
panel 
Table 2: General properties of benchmarking techniques 
Source: Adapted from Coelli (2012) 
 
4. Alternative Approach and Discussion 
 
The review of the benchmarking methods suggests that undertaking robust benchmarking of 
network security can pose challenges to energy regulators. The main challenge stems from 
the confusion surrounding the treatment, accounting and classification of different types of 
security costs, the choice of appropriate variables to include as cost drivers and, most 
importantly, the lack of comprehensive and quality data related to network security. 
Nonetheless, network security output indicators can be defined and designed while 
considering the existing data limitations, and incorporated in an incentive regulation 
framework. Our proposal to incorporate network security in incentive regulation framework 
by designing a network security output indicator is explained next. 
A network security metrics can be designed by including long, unplanned interruptions of at 
least 5 minutes (which are more frequent than exceptional events). Long, unplanned 
interruptions can mimic the impact of interruptions engendered by exceptional events since 
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interruptions from such events are often long and affect many customers. Using the long, 
unplanned interruptions also increases data availability for benchmarking analysis to derive 
the metrics. Hence, the allowed revenue or price path (Pt) of the regulated network company 
can be directly linked to the network security indicator in an incentive regulation framework 
where RPI is the retail price index, and X is the efficiency gain (or the efficiency factor). Q* 
is the network security adjustment parameter (or the network security output indicator) and is 
defined as an output measure of the continuity of supply (or service quality) for long, 
unplanned interruptions of at least 5 minutes. The annual values of Q* are calculated from 
benchmarking, ex-post on the basis of the companies’ performances, and can take a negative 
or a positive sign. A positive value of Q* implies that network security has improved more 
than required at the national level. 
 
Pt = Pt-1 (1+ RPI – X+ Q*) 
 
However, the adoption of statistical methods to account for exceptional events requires 
harmonisation of network security indicators and data collection procedures. This can be 
problematic in Europe because the understanding and definition of exceptional events varies 
between the EU member countries, where some countries adopt a more statistical approach 
while others qualitatively define exceptional events in terms of their causes (CEER, 2012). 
Not all EU countries share interruption statistics arising from exceptional events in their 
interruption database, such as Germany, Denmark and the UK. From a benchmarking 
perspective, it is desirable that interruption statistics from exceptional events are recorded and 
shared among the members. These factors also complicate the international benchmarking of 
network security in Europe. 
The results from benchmarking, if undertaken, may be inaccurate in the absence of adequate, 
good quality data pertaining to network security. The results may be informative and not 
deterministic from a regulatory perspective. Most importantly, undertaking network security 
benchmarking with limited data leads to inaccurate results while the costs of implementing it 
incorrectly are high, considering the distortions in large-scale future investments pertaining to 
network security. Hence, the need to design alternative approaches to treat large-scale 
security costs arises within incentive regulation. This is because incentive regulation is a 
paradigm while benchmarking is a tool which incentive regulation may embrace.  
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Network security costs capitalisation and network security cost pass-through are two input-
based approaches to treat network security costs within incentive regulation but are not 
subject to benchmarking. Capitalisation implies that security costs are treated as capital 
expenditures (i.e. cost capitalisation) and are included in the regulatory asset base (RAB) and 
depreciated in line with other assets. Network companies can earn a rate-of-return (or 
possibly extra rate-of-return) on network security-related capital expenditures, irrespective of 
security and efficiency improvements achieved.  
Cost pass-through involves treating the costs related to network security by passing them on 
to final consumers, assuming that the regulator accepts network security costs in the 
regulatory asset base (RAB). Hence, network security costs are treated as operational 
expenditures (Opex) of the network companies and are subject to direct pass-through under 
this approach. However, the regulator should cap or ex-ante approve the security costs to be 
capitalised or passed-through to mitigate the gold-plating of network security costs.  
The risks associated with large-scale and irreversible network security investments suggest 
that these investments can undergo the initial regulatory scrutiny and receive ex-ante 
approval or refusal For example; the RIIO (Revenue=Incentives+ Innovation + Outputs) 
model to be adopted in the UK requires that budget allowances undergo ex-ante regulatory 
approval. There are two regulatory tests determining the 'usefulness' and 'efficiency' of 
investments (Joskow, 2008; Brunekreeft, 2013). These ex-ante tests allow the regulator to 
detect whether a particular security investment is useful and whether investment is realised at 
an efficient cost.  
From a welfare economic perspective, the 'usefulness' test can be conducted by using a cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) as a systematic approach for calculating and comparing the benefits 
and costs of security investments in determining whether investments are justified and 
feasible. It involves comparing the total expected cost of each investment option to network 
security against the total benefits. Hence, an investment is useful if the benefits outweigh the 
costs (i.e. net benefit is positive). A social cost benefit analysis (SCBA) can also be carried 
out, although pricing the externalities arising from network security investments becomes a 
critical issue. 
The CBA framework on network security should account for the high-impact, low frequency 
nature of exceptional events. By definition, exceptional events are central to the concept of 
network security. Policy conclusions that do not comprehensively account for exceptional 
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events in a CBA of network security are incomplete. One possible approach to consider 
exceptional events such as the network security of CBA is by conducting a probabilistic or 
stochastic CBA (Azar and Lindgren, 2003). This approach assigns probabilities for the 
occurrence of exceptional events to estimate the expected benefits and costs. However, 
estimating realistic probabilities for exceptional security events and estimating the benefits of 
the correct or required level of investments is a major challenge and can test the suitability of 
SCBA to its limit. 
An alternative approach to assessing the usefulness and efficiency of network security 
investments is to undertake a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) of the required investments. 
A CEA analysis of security investments identifies the most economic or efficient way to 
undertake a given network security investment. CEA can provide an ex-ante evaluation to 
support decision-making that relates to network security and guides the choices to be made 
by decision makers. However, both CBA and CEA analyses of network security investments 
need to be accompanied with a sensitivity analysis in order to validate and increase the 
robustness of the results.  
5. Conclusions 
The novelty of the present paper is that it discussed and proposed the possible incorporation 
of network security in a benchmarking analysis within an incentive regulation framework. 
The need for large investments in achieving the European energy policy goals of 
sustainability, economic efficiency and security of supply places emphasis on the adaption 
and development of benchmarking as a useful tool for incentive regulation. This paper 
discussed the different considerations when benchmarking network security costs. We 
underscored the issues and options associated with different benchmarking approaches in 
terms of costs, cost drivers, data and techniques pertaining to network security.  
We discussed that network security cost benchmarking requires a clear understanding of the 
cost structure of networks. The need to understand the key security outputs provided by 
benchmarked companies along the network inputs used (and their price) and other associated 
exogenous variables such as key environmental factors remains crucial. The effectiveness of 
the use of more sophisticated techniques for network security costs benchmarking tends to be 
greater with the availability of relevant data. The use of panel data techniques to deal with 
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unobserved heterogeneity among the networks and the validity of the relevant comparator 
group in security benchmarking is also likely to depend on data availability.  
We also highlighted the accounting and classification issues of security costs, choice of cost 
drivers, data adequacy and quality and the choice of benchmarking techniques. Assembling 
and sharing of international datasets can mitigate data availability if compatible international 
data are available together with a proper understanding of the practical issues involved when 
using international data to benchmark domestic network companies. 
The use of network security costs benchmarking can be initially helpful as an informative 
rather than a deterministic tool in the incentive regulation of network security. However, 
network security costs can also be dealt with outside benchmarking but within an incentive 
regulation framework through cost capitalisation and costs pass-through. Stochastic CBA and 
CEA can be helpful to the regulator in assessing the usefulness and efficiency of network 
security investments. These approaches can complement each other and provide valuable 
information to the regulator with regards to the treatment of network security costs in an 
incentive-based regulatory framework.   
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